Categories are of explanatory value in metaphysics partly because a category is an essential kind: a kind such that, necessarily, whatever belongs to it belongs to it essentially.
Jan Nocompartió una citael año pasado
However, a nonspatial spirit or soul would be a concrete entity of an atypical sort that lacks spatial or temporal parts.
Jan Nocompartió una citael año pasado
(D1) x is a concrete entity = df. x belongs to an ontological category (at Level C) that has among its possible instances entities having spatial or temporal parts,6 and (D2) x is an abstract entity = df. x is not a concrete entity
Jan Nocompartió una citael año pasado
It is an interesting question when a kind is too specific to count as an ontological category.
Jan Nocompartió una citael año pasado
Subdivisions of the category of substance (at Level D) might include physical object and spirit, subdivisions of boundary might include surface and edge, and so on.
Jan Nocompartió una citael año pasado
Pairs, trios, and quartets of substances of which those substances are parts are collections (within mereology, or the theory of parts, one calls a collection of this kind a mereological sum or fusion).
Jan Nocompartió una citael año pasado
Holes, shadows, and gaps are absences (also known as privations).
Jan Nocompartió una citael año pasado
Surfaces, edges, and corners are boundaries (also known as limits).